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Abstract
Deep learning models are shown to be vulnerable to adversar-
ial examples. Though adversarial training can enhance model
robustness, typical approaches are computationally expen-
sive. Recent works proposed to transfer the robustness to ad-
versarial attacks across different tasks or models with soft la-
bels. Compared to soft labels, feature contains rich seman-
tic information and holds the potential to be applied to dif-
ferent downstream tasks. In this paper, we propose a novel
approach called Guided Adversarial Contrastive Distillation
(GACD), to effectively transfer adversarial robustness from
teacher to student with features. We first formulate this objec-
tive as contrastive learning and connect it with mutual infor-
mation. With a well-trained teacher model as an anchor, stu-
dents are expected to extract features similar to the teacher.
Then considering the potential errors made by teachers, we
propose sample reweighted estimation to eliminate the nega-
tive effects from teachers. With GACD, the student not only
learns to extract robust features, but also captures structural
knowledge from the teacher. By extensive experiments evalu-
ating over popular datasets such as CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100
and STL-10, we demonstrate that our approach can effec-
tively transfer robustness across different models and even
different tasks, and achieve comparable or better results than
existing methods. Besides, we provide a detailed analysis of
various methods, showing that students produced by our ap-
proach capture more structural knowledge from teachers and
learn more robust features under adversarial attacks.
Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) have achieved impressive per-
formances for many computer vision (LeCun, Bengio, and
Hinton 2015; He et al. 2016) and natural language process-
ing (Mikolov et al. 2013) tasks. Nevertheless, they are vul-
nerable to adversarial examples (Szegedy et al. 2014), and
their performances degrade sharply. Such adversarial exam-
ples are usually crafted by adding human-imperceptible per-
turbations, and able to mislead well-trained models at in-
ference time. Due to the potential safety risks, the exis-
tence of adversarial examples has been a crucial threat to
safety and reliability critical applications (Parkhi, Vedaldi,
and Zisserman 2015; Liu et al. 2019). Thus, extensive re-
searchers have devoted to studying and enhancing the ro-
bustness of DNNs (Schott et al. 2018; Zhong and Deng
2019; Prakash et al. 2018; Mao et al. 2019; Madry et al.
2018) against waves of new adversarial attacks (Papernot
et al. 2017; Carlini and Wagner 2017; Croce and Hein 2019;
Modas, Moosavi-Dezfooli, and Frossard 2019), where ad-
versarial training (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015;
Kannan, Kurakin, and Goodfellow 2018; Madry et al. 2018;
Shafahi et al. 2019) generates models with best adversarial
robustness, and undoubtedly is recognized as the strongest
defense method.
Adversarial training is based on a simple yet effective
idea. Compared to traditional training, it only requires to
involve training models with adversarial samples generated
in each training loop. It, however, is computationally ex-
pensive and time-consuming as it needs multiple gradient
computations to craft strong adversarial samples (Shafahi
et al. 2019). To circumvent the high cost of adversarial train-
ing, recently various methods have been developed and in-
troduced to transfer adversarial robustness between mod-
els (Papernot et al. 2016b; Goldblum et al. 2020). Currently
existing methods are based on the idea of distillation (Hin-
ton, Vinyals, and Dean 2015), and use soft labels.
Another problem neglected in distillation for adversarial
robustness is that there are many errors made by the teach-
ers. Compared to the naturally trained models, adversari-
ally trained models usually have a performance degrada-
tion on classification accuracy, which is theoretically proved
in (Tsipras et al. 2019; Su et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2019a). In
existing distillation methods, errors from teachers are trans-
ferred to students as well.
Here, we propose a teacher-error aware method to trans-
fer robustness with features, called Guided Adversarial Con-
trastive Distillation (GACD). Our method is inspired by the
observation that features learned by DNNs are purified dur-
ing adversarial training (see Figure 5 in (Allen-Zhu and Li
2020)), which are more aligned with input images in seman-
tic. (Xie et al. 2019) empirically proved models with puri-
fied features are more robust to adversarial examples. So the
core idea of GACD is training a student model to imitate the
teacher model to extract similar robust features under some
similarity metrics. With the context of contrastive learning,
the teacher model is used as an anchor and the student model
learns to be aligned with the the teacher. However, the an-
chor is not always reliable as explained in last paragraph. So
we use sample re-weighting to eliminate the negative effects
caused by bad anchorS. Through experiments in CIFAR-10,
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CIFAR-100 and STL-10, we show that our approach outper-
forms other methods in classification accuracy and transfer-
ability. Some students are even better than the teachers.
In summary, the key contributions of this paper are as fol-
lows:
• To our best knowledge, we are the first to transfer adver-
sarial robustness across different model architectures with
features. Based on contrastive learning, we proposed a
novel approach called GACD with awareness of teacher’s
mistakes.
• Through extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
100 and STL-10, it is shown that our method outper-
forms existing distillation methods, achieving comparable
or higher classification accuracy and better transferability.
• By conducting analysis of different methods in feature
space, we show our method is more effective in captur-
ing structural knowledge from teachers and extracts more
gathered and robust features between classes.
Related Work
In this section, we review the prior work on adversarial at-
tacks, adversarial training and robustness distillation.
Adversarial Training. Since (Szegedy et al. 2014) first
proved the existence of adversarial examples, extensive ad-
versarial attacks (Papernot et al. 2016a; Dong et al. 2018;
Carlini and Wagner 2017; Madry et al. 2018) have been
proposed, showing the vulnerability of neural networks fac-
ing inputs with imperceptible perturbations. (Goodfellow,
Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) assumed the vulnerability of
neural networks caused by linearity and proposed a single-
step method called Fast Gradient Sign Methods (FGSM).
Then iterative attacks (Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio
2016; Madry et al. 2018) were studied and proved to be
stronger than FGSM under the same metric norm. Momen-
tum is introduced in (Dong et al. 2018) and enhanced the
transferability of untargeted attacks.
As adversaries could launch attacks with 100% success
rate on well-trained models with small perturbation budget
, defense methods (Madry et al. 2018; Liao et al. 2018;
Prakash et al. 2018; Qin et al. 2020; Gupta and Rahtu 2019)
are developed right after. Adversarial training is proved to be
most effective among these methods, which simply requires
to train models on adversarial examples progressively. In-
tuitively, adversarial training encourages models to predict
correctly in an -ball surrounding data points. Many variants
of adversarial training have been developed from this obser-
vation. Recently (Zhang and Wang 2019) introduced a fea-
ture scatter-based approach for adversarial training, which
generates adversarial examples in latent space in a unsuper-
vised way. (Qin et al. 2019) noticed the highly convoluted
loss surface by gradient obfuscation (Athalye, Carlini, and
Wagner 2018), and introduced a local linearity regularizer
(LLR) to adversarial training to encourage the loss surface
behave linearly. (Zhang et al. 2019a) decomposed the classi-
fication errors on adversarial examples and proposed a reg-
ularization term to improve adversarial robustness.
Self-Supervised Learning. Based on deep learning mod-
els, self-supervised learning methods are becoming more
and more powerful, and gaining increasing popularity. The
normal approach of self-supervised learning is training mod-
els to learn general representations out of unlabeled data,
which can be later used for specific tasks, like image clas-
sification. Predictive approaches have shown to be effective
to learn representations (Doersch, Gupta, and Efros 2015;
Zhang, Isola, and Efros 2017; Noroozi and Favaro 2016).
Contrastive learning is another collection of powerful meth-
ods for self-supervised representation learning. Inspired
by (Gutmann and Hyva¨rinen 2010; Mnih and Kavukcuoglu
2013; Sohn 2016), the core idea of contrastive learning
is learning representations that is close under some dis-
tance metrics for samples in same classes (positive samples)
and pushing apart representations between different classes
(negative samples). By leveraging the instance-level identity
for self-supervised learning, contrastive learning are shown
to be effective in learning representations (Chen et al. 2020;
He et al. 2019; Tian et al. 2020), and achieves comparable
performances to supervised methods. Note that such meth-
ods are used to learn embeddings. At test time, the embed-
dings are utilized for other tasks with fine tuning.
Knowledge Distillation. Distillation is originally intro-
duced in (Hinton, Vinyals, and Dean 2015) to compress
model size while preserving performances with a student-
teacher scheme. The student usually has a small, lightweight
architecture. Thereafter, more distillation methods are pro-
posed (Heo et al. 2019; Zhang et al. 2019b; Park et al.
2019; Tian, Krishnan, and Isola 2020). (Park et al. 2019)
noticed relationships between samples are usually neglected
and proposed Relational Knowledge Distillation (RKD),
while (Tian, Krishnan, and Isola 2020) adapted contrastive
learning into knowledge distillation and formulated the dis-
tillation problems as maximizing the mutual infomation be-
tween student and teacher representations. And (Zhang et al.
2019b) proposed self distillation to distill knowledge from
the model itself. Note that such distillation methods only
preserve performances in student models.
Knowledge distillation is firstly adapted for obtaining
or transferring adversarial robustness in (Papernot et al.
2016b), which is called defensive distillation. Defensive dis-
tillation requires student and teacher models have the identi-
cal architectures. Due to gradient masking, defensive distil-
lation improves the robustness of the student model under a
certain attack. It, however, doesn’t make the decision bound-
ary secure and is circumvented by (Carlini and Wagner
2017) soon. Recently (Goldblum et al. 2020) studied how
to distill adversarial robustness onto student models with
knowledge distillation. And a line of work explores trans-
ferring adversarial robustness between models with same
architectures. (Hendrycks, Lee, and Mazeika 2019) shows
large gains on adversarial robustness from pre-training on
data from different domain. Another work uses the idea of
transfer learning and builds new models on the top of ro-
bust feature extractors (Shafahi et al. 2020). In contrastive
to these methods, our method focuses on robust feature dis-
tillation, and is not restricted to same model architectures.
Guided Adversarial Contrastive Distillation
In this section, we start by defining feature distillation be-
tween teachers and students. Then we formulate the problem
with contrastive learning and show the connection between
our objective and mutual information. Lastly we derive our
final objective function.
Problem Definition
Teacher-student paradigm is widely used in knowledge dis-
tillation. Given two deep neural networks, a teacher f t and
a student fs, and their architectures are not necessarily to
be identical. Let {(x, y) | x ∈ X} with K classes be
the training data. Then the representations extracted at the
penultimate layer (the layer before logits) are denoted as
f t(x) and fs(x). During distillation, for two random sam-
ples xi and xj , we expect to push representations fs(xi)
and f t(xi) closer if i = j, while pushing fs(xi) and f t(xj)
apart if i 6= j. Figure 1 gives a visual explanation of this
intuition. Note that we use adversarially robust models as
teacher models as in (Goldblum et al. 2020). The features
extracted by the teacher and student are transformed to the
same dimension, refering to normalized embedding.
Input 
Image
Student
Teacher
𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑖)
𝑓𝑡(𝑥𝑖)
𝑓𝑠(𝑥𝑗)
normalized
embedding
features
Figure 1: Illustration of feature distillation with contrastive
learning.
Connecting to Mutual Information
Contrastive learning is commonly used to extract features
in a unsupervised way, and the core idea is learning rep-
resentations that is close under some distance metrics for
samples in same classes (positive samples) and pushing
apart samples from different classes (negative samples). Fol-
lowing the recent setups for contrastive learning (Gutmann
and Hyva¨rinen 2010; Mnih and Kavukcuoglu 2013; Tian,
Krishnan, and Isola 2019), we select samples from train-
ing data X : {x ∼ pdata (x)}, and construct a set S ={
x+, x−1 , x
−
2 . . . x
−
k
}
where there are a single positive sam-
ples and k negative samples from different classes.
Since the teacher model is pretrained and fixed dur-
ing distillation, we simply enumerate positives and nega-
tives for student model from S. Then we have one con-
trastive congruent pair (the same input given to teacher
and student model) for every k incongruent pairs (differ-
ent inputs given to teacher and student model) as given in
Spair := {(t+, s+), (t+, s−1 ), (t+, s−2 ) . . . (t+, s−k )}, where
we denote f t(x) as t, and fs(x) as s for simplicity.
Now we define a distribution q with latent variable C:
• when C = 1, the congruent pair (t, s) is drawn from the
joint distribution p(t, s),
q(t, s | C = 1) = p(t, s). (1)
• when C = 0, the incongruent pair (t, s) is drawn from the
joint distribution p(t)p(s),
q(t, s | C = 0) = p(t)p(s). (2)
According to set S, the priors on C are
q(C = 1) =
1
k + 1
, q(C = 0) =
k
k + 1
. (3)
By applying Bayes’ rule, we can easily derive the posterior
for class C = 1:
q(C = 1 | t, s)
=
q(t, s | C = 1)q(C = 1)
q(t, s | C = 0)q(C = 0) + q(t, s | C = 1)q(C = 1)
=
p(t, s)
kp(t)p(s) + p(t, s)
≤ p(t, s)
kp(t)p(s)
.
(4)
Then taking log of both sides of (4), we have
log q(C = 1 | t, s) ≤ log p(t, s)
kp(t)p(s)
≤ − log(k) + log p(t, s)
p(t)p(s)
.
(5)
By taking expectation on both sides w.r.t. p(t, s) or
q(t, s | C = 1) (they are equal as shown in Eq. (1)), the con-
nection with mutual information is given as:
MI(t; s) ≥ log(k) + Eq(t,s|C=1) log q(C = 1 | t, s), (6)
where MI(t; s) represents the mutual information between
t and s.
Thus, our objective is to maximize the lower bound of
mutual information, and consistent with (van den Oord, Li,
and Vinyals 2018; Poole et al. 2019; Tian, Krishnan, and
Isola 2019, 2020).
Sample Reweighted Noise Contrastive Estimation
To maximize the right side of Inequality (6), the distribu-
tion q(C = 1 | t, s) is required. Though we don’t have the
true distribution, we can estimate it by fitting a model (Gut-
mann and Hyva¨rinen 2010; Goodfellow et al. 2014) based
on teacher-student pairs in Spair.
Before proceeding, we first retrospect the pair set. As
shown in Spair, the teacher is fixed and plays as an anchor.
If the anchor gets wrong, the whole set is not reliable. And it
is known that there is a large drop on performances of adver-
sarially trained models as explained in (Zhang et al. 2019a;
Madry et al. 2018). The robust teacher models in adversarial
settings are not as good as the naturally trained teacher mod-
els in benign settings (e.g. roughly 76% v.s. 95% on CIFAR-
10). Thus, a large amount of errors made by teacher models
are transferred to student models along with knowledge dur-
ing distillation, which is indeed serious but neglected in ex-
isting methods (Shafahi et al. 2020; Goldblum et al. 2020).
The direct way to handle this problem is removing sam-
ples which are misclassified by the teacher during training.
However, this will reduce the amount of training data. Be-
sides, such surrogate loss holds inherent limitations, such
as computational hardness. Instead, we propose Sample
Reweighted Noise Contrastive Estimation, which assigns
smaller weights to misclassified samples and greater weights
to those classified correctly by the teacher (see Algorithm 1).
With softmax outputs of teacher models at hand, we pick up
the probability of true class for each sample as the weight,
and denote it as wt. The higher the probability, the greater
the chance of samples classified correctly. Hence, the mis-
classified samples do not significantly affect the estimation
process.
Now we formulate the estimation of q(C = 1 | t, s) as
a binary classification problem and our goal is to maximize
the log likelihood. We use h to represent the classification
model, which takes t and s as inputs and gives the probabil-
ity of C. Then we have
q(C = 1 | t, s) = h(t, s), (7)
q(C = 0 | t, s) = 1− h(t, s). (8)
The probabilities for two classes are given in Eq. (3). Con-
sidering the sample weights, the log-likelihood on Spair is
re-formulated as
`(h,wt) =
∑
(t,s)∈Spair
wtC logP (C = 1 | t, s)+
wt (1− C) logP (C = 0 | t, s)
=wt log
[
h
(
t+, s+
)]
+
k∑
i=1
wt log
[
1− h (t+, s−i )] .
(9)
Formally the log likelihood of h is expressed as
L(h,wt) =Eq(t,s|C=1)[wt log h(t, s)]+
kEq(t,s|C=0)[wt log(1− h(t, s))],
(10)
where Eq(t,s|C=0)[wt log(1 − h(t, s))] is strictly negative,
and wt can not be larger than 1. Thus, adding the second
term to the right side of Inequality (6), it still holds. We
rewrite the inequality as below:
I(t; s) ≥ log(k) + L(h∗), (11)
where L(h∗) is the upper bound of L(h).
To summarize, our final learning problem is to learn a
student model fs to maximize the log likelihood L(h) (see
Eq. 10).
Experimental Results
In this section, we conduct a series of experiments to evalu-
ate adversarial robustness and transferability of our method.
Then we illustrate the selection of hyper-parameters, and
study the influence of teacher’s error on distillation.
Algorithm 1: Guided Adversarial Contrastive Distilla-
tion (GACD)
Input: Teacher model f t, student model fs, estimation
model h, number of negatives k, learning rate r
Output: The final student model parameter θs
Data: Training Data Dtrain
for each training iteration do
Sample (x, y) ∼ Dtrain ;
Construct S = {x+, x−1 , x−2 . . . x−k } ;
t+ ← f t(x+) ;
wt ← pypred=y (f t, t+) ;
for x−i ∈ S do
s−i ← fs(x+) ;
end
Spair ← {(t+, s+), (t+, s−1 ) . . . (t+, s−k )} ;
θs ← θs + r∇
(LSpair (h,wt)) ;
end
Datasets
Totally we consider three different datasets in our experi-
ments: (1) CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, Hinton et al. 2009) con-
tains 60K images in 10 classes, of which 50K for training
and 10K for testing. (2) CIFAR-100. It is just like CIFAR-
10, except it has 100 classes containing 600 images each. (3)
STL-10 (Coates, Ng, and Lee 2011). There is a training set
of 50K labeled images from 10 classes and 100K unlabeled
images, and a test set of 8K images.
We use CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 for evaluating clas-
sification accuracy of different distillation methods, while
STL-10 and CIFAR-100 are used to test the transferability
of distilled students.
Implementation Details
Construction of Sample Set. There are negatives and
positives within a sample set. As our method is supervised,
we sample negatives from different classes rather than dif-
ferent instances, when picking up a positive sample from the
same class. However, we did some modifications on positive
samples. As suggested in (Goldblum et al. 2020), not all ro-
bust models are good teachers, so that distillation with nat-
ural images often results unexpected failures. In our view,
adversarial examples are like hard examples supporting the
decision boundaries. Without hard examples, the distilled
models would certainly make mistakes. Thus, we adopt a
self-supervised way to generate adversarial examples using
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD). Given a certain budget
of perturbations, we aim to find the perturbation which leads
to maximal distortion on features. The distance metric we
use of features is Wasserstein Distance used in (Zhang and
Wang 2019).
Estimation Model h. h is used in the binary classifi-
cation problem so that we can estimate the distribution
q(C = 1 | t, s). The only requirement for h is that the out-
put of h has to be in the range of [0, 1]; for example,
Teacher ResNet 18 WRN-34-2
Student ResNet 18 WRN-34-2 MobileNetV2 ResNet 18 WRN-34-2 MobileNetV2
Method Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv.
KD 76.13 40.13 73.12 34.16 76.86 38.21 90.50 4.63 86.88 0.08 92.49 5.46
ARD 79.49 51.21 79.05 50.16 79.47 50.22 82.88 45.65 81.76 48.1 82.00 46.25
GACD+AFT 82.73 52.75 85.35 55.19 79.59 50.10 82.33 49.42 85.96 52.54 79.18 49.07
GACD 84.14 42.12 86.28 45.66 81.84 39.51 84.16 40.60 86.74 44.64 81.13 36.05
Table 1: Classification accuracy (%) of student models with different methods on CIFAR-10. For each teacher, there are three
students with different architecture style and network capacity. We mainly compare GACD with KD (Hinton, Vinyals, and
Dean 2015) and ARD (Goldblum et al. 2020).
Teacher ResNet 56 WRN-40-2
Student ResNet 32 WRN-16-2 MobileNetV2 ResNet 32 WRN-16-2 MobileNetV2
Method Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv.
KD 60.69 4.94 63.51 4.95 55.93 4.70 60.80 2.99 62.67 3.68 56.15 3.69
ARD 50.85 12.60 50.32 13.11 51.78 13.60 49.94 14.47 49.27 16.19 49.09 20.58
GACD+AFT 49.86 24.28 51.81 24.65 49.43 19.93 50.58 24.27 52.11 25.05 49.21 19.75
GACD 52.26 13.68 49.71 13.60 45.08 10.05 49.62 13.41 52.59 14.03 44.63 10.69
Table 2: Classification accuracy (%) of student models with different methods on CIFAR-100.
h(t, s) = e
t′s/T
et′s/T+ kM
, where T is the temperature and M is
the cardinality of the dataset. Alternatively, h can be a net-
work like the discriminator in Generative Adversarial Net-
work (GAN) (Goodfellow et al. 2014). We use the former in
our experiments.
Adversarial Fine-Tuning. Existing contrastive learn-
ing methods leverage linear evaluation for downstream
tasks (Dosovitskiy et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2020; He et al.
2019). Concretely, it requires to learn a linear layer lψ(·) on
top of the fixed and well-trained contrastive learning mod-
els fθ(·). But it is proved in (Allen-Zhu and Li 2020) that
deep models are not guaranteed to be adversarially robust
if only low level features are robust. In contrastive learning,
last layer is vulnerable to adversarial examples. So we do
full network fine-tuning with adversarial training after fea-
ture distillation.
Robustness Evaluation of Student Model
Setup. We experiment on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 with
different student-teacher combinations of various model
capacity. For CIFAR-10, ResNet18 (He et al. 2016) and
WideResNet-34-10 (Zagoruyko and Komodakis 2016) are
teacher models, while for CIFAR-100 we use ResNet56
and WideResNet-40-2. The performances of adversarially
trained teacher models are listed in Table 3. We use different
teacher-student combinations to show our approach is model
agnostic. More details will be introduced in following sec-
tions.
Dataset CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Model Resent18 WRN-34-10 ResNet56 WRN-40-2
Nat. 76.54 84.41 59.29 60.27
Adv. 44.46 45.75 20.32 22.40
Table 3: Classification accuracy (%) of different adversari-
ally trained teacher models on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100.
We use Nat. to denote classification accuracy on natural im-
ages, and Adv. on adversarial images.
Results. We mainly compare GACD with KD (Hinton,
Vinyals, and Dean 2015) and ARD (Goldblum et al. 2020).
Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the performances of differ-
ent distillation methods on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 from
two aspects: natural accuracy and adversarial accuracy under
20-step PGD attack. Unless specified, we use perturbation
budget  = 8/255 under l∞, and 20-step PGD attack as the
default in our experiments. We also investigate the influence
of model architectures. Specifically, we select three different
students for each teacher. These students differ from model
capacity to architectural style.
We use ResNet18, WRN-34-2 and MobileNet V2 as stu-
dent models on CIFAR-10. Our approach has the best re-
sults in natural accuracy and adversarial accuracy for most
student-teacher combinations (see Table 1), which exceed
teacher models as well. While on CIFAR-100, we use
ResNet32, WRN-40-2, and MobileNetV2 as student mod-
els. As shown in Table 2, student models produced by our
approach have the best adversarial robustness among all the
methods. Students with KD have best natural accuracy bust
worst adversarial robustness.
Transferability of Distilled Features
Setup. In representation learning, a primary goal is to
learn general knowledge. In other words, the representations
or features learned could be applied to different tasks or
datasets that are not used for training. Therefore, in this sec-
tion we test if the features distilled transfer well.
We use ResNet18 as teacher and student models. In our
experiment, models are frozen once trained and used to ex-
tract features later (the layer prior to the logit). Then we train
a linear classifier on the top of frozen student models to per-
form classification, and show the transferability of the dis-
tilled features on STL-10 and CIFAR-100.
Results. We compared GACD with different methods and
the results are reported in Table 4. As illustrated, all dis-
tillation methods improve the transferability of learned fea-
tures on both natural images and adversarial examples. Our
method shows the best performances on both datasets with
average 11.8% improvement on natural accuracy and 5.84%
on adversarial accuracy.
Datasets STL10 CIFAR-100
Methods Nat. Adv. Nat. Adv.
Teacher Adv. Training 48.81 28.40 27.17 11.42
Student
KD 56.79 29.33 30.64 12.03
ARD 59.94 35.16 32.17 15.06
GACD (Ours) 63.05 35.48 36.52 16.02
Table 4: Illustration of transferability of different student
models. Here we use 7-step PGD attack to evaluate adver-
sarial robustness (%).
Hyper-parameters
We investigate the influence of two main hyper-parameters
used in our method: (1) the number of negative samples k
in Eq. 10, and (2) the temperature T which suppresses soft-
max probability. The architectures of teacher and student are
both ResNet18. But note that our method is model agnostic.
Experiments are conducted on CIFAR-10 and the results are
shown in Figure 2.
Number of Negative Samples k. We validated a series of
different k: 16, 64, 256, 1024, 4096 and 16384. As shown in
Figure 2a, adversarial robustness increases as k gets large.
Natural accuracy falls down due to the trade-off (Zhang et al.
2019a). As the accuracy is highest when k = 16384, we use
k = 16384 in all experiments reported.
Temperature. We experimented with Temperature T be-
tween 0.01 and 0.3, and illustrate the results when T =
0.02, 0.05, 0.07, 0.1, 0.2 in Figure 2b. As we can see, the
best natural and adversarial accuracy are obtained when
T = 0.1, while some extreme values give sub-optimal so-
lutions. Thus, we picked up T = 0.1 in our experiments.
16 64 128 1024 4096 16384
Number of Negatives
80
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(a) Effects of varying k.
0.02 0.05 0.07 0.1 0.2
Temperature
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(b) Effects of varying T.
Figure 2: Effects of varying the number of negative samples
and the temperature.
Ablation Study
In GACD, we assign small importance on samples which
are misclassified by teacher. The reason is that we believe
wrong predictions made by the teacher would have a neg-
ative influence on students. For illustration, we temporarily
remove sample importance in GACD to see the difference.
We select ResNet18 as the teacher while WRN-34-10 as the
student, and validate on CIFAR-10. The natural and adver-
sarial accuracy we got are 83.53% and 54.23% for WRN-
34-10. Apparently there is a drop compared to the original
(see Table 1).
In addition, we applied sample re-weighting to ARD to
evaluate its effectiveness. Other settings or parameters in
ARD are exactly the same. With ResNet18 as the teacher,
the classification results of student WRN-34-10 are 80.59%
and 54.23%, increased by 1.54% and 4.07% on natural ac-
curacy and adversarial accuracy respectively.
So we can conclude sample re-weighting indeed helps im-
prove the performances of students in distillation.
Distilled Feature Analysis
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of latent rep-
resentations or features extracted by students with different
methods.
Inter-class Correlations
For classification problems, cross-entropy is widely used as
the objective function. It, however, ignores the correlations
between classes. Knowledge distillation solves this problem
with a teacher model. Soft labels are the key component for
its success, which inherently contains correlations between
classes. Such correlations contribute to the performances of
student models. To illustrate the capability of capturing cor-
relations in different methods, we computed the differences
between the correlation metrices of the teachers’ and stu-
dents’ logits.
Since the objective functions of KD and ARD are highly
similar, we select ARD and compare with our method.
Figure 3 shows the differences with natural images as inputs,
while Figure 4 shows the differences on adversarial images.
Clearly we can see there are significant reductions (light
color) of differences between teachers and students with our
method, compared to ARD. This means our method captures
more structural knowledge during distillation, which is also
supported by the increased accuracy.
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Figure 3: Differences of logits correlations between teach-
ers and students on natural data from CIFAR-100. For visu-
alization, we use WRN-40-2 as teacher and WRN-16-2 as
student.
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Figure 4: Differences of logits correlations between teach-
ers and students on adversarial data from CIFAR-100. Same
models are used as in Figure 3.
Feature under Attacks
We further investigate how natural images and adversarial
images are represented in feature space by different models.
The t-SNE visualization of high dimensional latent represen-
tations of sampled images is shown in Figure 5. Concretely,
we sampled two-class images (bird and truck) from CIFAR-
10 for illustration, and crafted adversarial images (namely
adv truck) which originally belong to truck but misclassified
as bird. The green and blue points indicate the natural im-
ages of trucks and birds, while red points represent images
of adv trucks. Then these samples are fed into four models:
standard undefended model, adversarially trained teacher,
and two student models with ARD and our method GACD.
For the standard undefended model (Figure 5a), all samples
of adv trucks are misclassified birds (red points are mixed
with blue points), and far from the original class (green
points). Other three models show adversarial robustness as
most samples from adv truck as classified as trucks. How-
ever, there are several red points falling into the green clus-
ter for student with ARD (Figure 5c). Besides, there is no
clear boundary as data points are kind of mixed. In contrast,
with our proposed GACD, Figure 5d clearly shows larger
distances between classes and smaller intra-class distances.
The differences in feature space are also reflected on adver-
sarial classification accuracy.
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Figure 5: Illustration of latent representation generated by
different models. The blue and green points are 100 ran-
domly sampled natural images from class ’bird’ and ’truck’
respectively, while the red points are adversarial images
crafted from images from class truck.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel approach: Guided Adver-
sarial Contrastive Distillation (GACD) to transfer adversar-
ial robustness with features, which is different from existing
distillation methods. Theoretically, we formulate our distil-
lation problem into contrastive learning, and connect it to
mutual information. Taking teacher’s error into considera-
tion, we propose sample reweighted noise contrastive esti-
mation, which is proved to be applicable to other distillation
methods as well. Compared to other methods in extensive
experiments, Our method captures more structural knowl-
edge and shows comparable or even better performances. In
addition, our method has the best transferability across tasks
or models. In the future, we will look deep into deep learning
models, find the key property leading to adversarial robust-
ness and develop efficient methods for distillation.
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